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Fall River: The NLRB's Expansive
Successorship Doctrine
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) of the 1980s has been
widely accused of being biased in favor of management. I Thus, when the Board does
issue an order favoring a union, the reviewing court might feel obliged to enforce it.
Regrettably, the Supreme Court appears to have yielded to this temptation when it
took one of its infrequent looks at the successor employer doctrine in Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB. 2 This Comment argues that the Court incorrectly
approved of the Board's broad application of the successorship doctrine in this case,
producing a result which was unfair to both the employer and the employees.
I. FAcrS
In 1982 Sterlingwale Corp. (Sterlingwale) closed the textile dyeing and finishing
plant that it had operated in Fall River, Massachusetts for over thirty years.3 The
company laid off most of its employees in February 19824 and went out of business
several months later.5 A new company, Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. (Fall
River), bought most of Sterlingwale's real property and equipment from Sterling-
wale's secured creditors. 6 Fall River also purchased Sterlingwale's inventory and
some other assets at a public auction.7 Fall River commenced operations in
September 1982.8 Initially, most of its employees were former employees of
Sterlingwale. 9 By the time the new company was operating at full capacity, however,
less than half of its employees were former Sterlingwale employees.10
United Textile Workers Local 292 (Local 292 or Union) had represented
Sterlingwale's employees for many years," and Fall River refused the Union's
request to bargain with it. 12 The issue in this case was whether this refusal constituted
1. See, e.g., Gould, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor
Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. Ray. 937 (1986); Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase 1, 46 OHIO Sr. L.J.
95 (1985); veiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. R v.
1769 (1983); veiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98
HARv. L. Ray. 351 (1984); Comment, The Guards Trilogy: The NLRB Lowers the Guard on Employee Rights, 35 Am.
U.L. REv. 175 (1985); Note, The National Labor Relations Board at SO: Politicization Creates Crisis, 52 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 229 (1986); but see Coleman, The New, "New- Reagan National Labor Relations Board and the Outlook for the
Future, 34 FED. B. NEws & J. 255, 255 (1987) (maintaining that the Reagan Board "has merely brought the decisions
of the NLRB back to [the Board's] statutorily mandated 'neutral' position").
2. 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
3. Id. at 2229-30.
4. Id. at 2229.
5. Id. at 2230.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2230-31.
10. Id. at 2231.
11. Id. at 2229.
12. Id. at 2230.
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a violation of subsections 8(a)(1) 13 and 8(a)(5)14 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act). Subsection 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits an employer from interfering
with its employees' choice of a bargaining representative. Subsection 8(a)(5) of the
Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the
representative of its employees. The resolution of this issue turned on whether the
successor employer doctrine applied to Fall River and on whether Local 292 could be
considered the exclusive representative of Fall River's employees.
A panel of the National Labor Relations Board found, by a vote of two to one,
that Fall River had violated subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act and ordered it
to bargain with the Union.15 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
enforced the order by the same margin, 16 and the Supreme Court affirmed by a vote
of six to three.
I. BACKGROUND
The National Labor Relations Act, 17 which was passed in 1935, sought to
promote industrial peace by establishing a federal policy of encouraging and
facilitating collective bargaining.' 8 The duty to bargain imposed on employers by
subsection 8(a)(5) of the Act is based on the premise that collective bargaining is the
best way to further the mutual interests of the parties. 19 The Act is silent on whether
the duties it imposes on employers extend to situations where one employer succeeds
to the business of another. Successorship can occur in a variety of contexts, such as
"merger, sale of stock, sale of assets, loss of a renewable contract, incorporation of
a formerly unincorporated entity, dissolution of a corporation, bankruptcy, and other
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Subsection 8(a)(1) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 71."
Section 7, in turn, provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activites for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). Subsection 8(a)(5) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
[subsection 9(a)]." Subsection 9(a), in turn, provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
15. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 272 N.L.R.B. 839 (1984), enforced, 775 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
16. NLRB v. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 775 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
17. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
19. See H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970) ("The basic theme of the Act was that through
collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open
discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.").
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means. "20 The duties of successor employers have been developed by the NLRB and
the federal courts.
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston.2 The case involved an employer, Wiley, which had merged with a
smaller company, Interscience Publishers, Inc.2 2 Prior to the merger, Interscience
had signed a collective bargaining agreement that included an arbitration clause. 23 At
the time of the merger, Wiley and the union representing Interscience's employees
were unable to agree whether or not Wiley would be bound by the arbitration
clause. 24 The Supreme Court held that
the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the
employees covered by the agreement, and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here,
the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement.2 5
Immediately following Wiley, it was unclear how extensive the duties of
successor employers were.2 6 The Court addressed this issue in NLRB v. Burns
International Security Services, Inc.27 In Burns, an employer acquired a plant
protection service contract that had previously been held by a competitor, Wackenhut
Corp.28 A majority of the security guards hired by the new employer, Burns, were
former employees of Wackenhut. 29 Wackenhut had recently negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement with the United Plant Guard Workers of America, which the
Board had certified several months earlier to represent Wackenhut's employees. 30
The Court held that Burns was not bound by the substantive terms of the contract to
which it had not agreed,3 1 but that it was obligated to bargain with the union.32
20. Silver, Reflections on the Obligations of a Successor Employer, 2 CARDozo L. RE. 545, 545 n. 1 (1981). For
discussions of the successorship doctrine in the context of mergers and acquisitions, see Fasman & Fischler, Labor
Relations Consequences of Mergers andAcquisitions, 13 E.p. RE. L.J. 14 (1987) and Mace, The Supreme Court's Labor
Law Successorship Doctrine After Fall River Dyeing, 39 LAB. L.J. 102 (1988). For a discussion of the effect of the federal
Bankruptcy Code on the duty to bargain, see West, Life After Bilidisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good
Faith, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 65 (1986). The successor employer doctrine should be distinguished from the doctrine that an
employer remains bound by a collective bargaining agreement if it is the alter ego of the employer that entered into the
agreement, see Note, Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role of Employer Motive in Corporate Transformations, 86
MicH. L. Ray. 1024, 1033-38 (1988), or if it is a "continuing employer" which "remain[s] intact and unaltered" after
a transfer of ownership. EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1988). See also District 1 199P, Nat'l Union
of Hosp. and Health Care Employees v. NLRB, 864 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussion of whether either the
successorship doctrine or the alter ego doctrine applies when an employer closes a facility with the intention of selling it,
but later reopens the facility).
21. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
22. Id. at 544-45.
23. Id. at 544, 547.
24. Id. at 546.
25. Id. at 548.
26. See Note, The Duties of Successor Employers Under John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston and Its Progeny, 43
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 498 (1968).
27. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
28. Id. at 274.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 281-82.
32. Id. at 278.
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In the Supreme Court's next major successorship case, Howard Johnson Co. v.
Detroit Local Joint Executive Board,33 one company purchased a hotel and restaurant
from another. 34 The new employer, Howard Johnson, hired an almost entirely new
work force, retaining a few of the former owner's employees. 35 The Court held that
Howard Johnson was not bound by the arbitration provision in its predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement, in part because of a lack of "substantial continuity
in the identity of the work force.' '36
The Supreme Court cautioned in Howard Johnson that the label "successor
employer" may be misleading because "a new employer ... may be a successor for
some purposes and not for others.' ' 37 Therefore, "the real question . . . is, on the
particular facts, what are the legal obligations of the new employer to the employees
of the former owner or their representative?" 38 Thus, in Fall River, the issue was not
simply whether Fall River could be considered Sterlingwale's "successor," but
whether Fall River had an obligation to bargain with the union that the Board had
certified as the representative of Sterlingwale's employees.
Under the rationale of Wiley, Burns, and Howard Johnson, this obligation
turned on two questions. The first was whether, at the appropriate time, 39 a majority
33. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
34. Id. at 250.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 263.
37. Id. at 263 n.9.
38. Id. at 262 n.9.
39. The time when a successor employer's duty to bargain arises was a major issue in Fall River. For the first time,
the Supreme Court addressed the Board's "substantial and representative complement" rule. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at
2237-40. The First Circuit explained that
[i]n a successorship situation, the bargaining obligation can normally be determined at the time of transfer or
when operations begin. In other instances, however, such as when an employer is rebuilding a collapsed
business or is operating at a substantially reduced capacity, a delay in making the determination may be
appropriate. As the Supreme Court has noted, a determination regarding the successor's obligation to bargain
may have to wait "until the successor employer has hired his full complement of employees .... since it will
not be evident until then that the bargaining representative represents a majority of employees in the unit as
required by Section 9(a) of the Act."
Fall River, 775 F.2d at 430 (quoting Burns, 406 U.S. at 295).
In Fall River, the new employer started its operations gradually, beginning in September 1982. See Fall River, 107
S. Ct. at 2230. The Board found that "the first shift was at almost full operating level when a second shift was commenced
in January 1983." Fall River, 272 N.L.R.B. at 840. Two full shifts were in place by April 1983. See id. Fall River argued
that the correct point in time for assessing whether it had a duty to bargain with Local 292 was April 1983, id., relying
on the "full complement" language in Burns. The NLRB, on the other hand, made this determination as of January 1983.
Id. The distinction is outcome-determinative because, as of the earlier date, a majority of Fall River's employees were
former employees of Sterlingwale, while, as of the later date, this was no longer true. Id. In the absence of such a
majority, no duty to bargain with the union would attach. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 295. But see infa note 41 and
accompanying text.
In arriving at the January 1983 date, the Board applied the administratively created rule that the bargaining obligation
arises when the new employer has hired a substantial and representative complement of employees. Fall River, 272
N.L.R.B. at 840. The rationale for this rule is that the start-up of operations may last for a long period of time and that,
without such a rule, a new employer may continuously expand his business and claim that he has never reached a "full
complement" of employees. See NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates, Inc., 639 F.2d 865, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1981). The
"substantial and representative complement rule" strikes a balance between the right of the first employees hired to
prompt representation and the right of employees hired later to a voice in choosing their representative. Fall River, 107
S. Ct. at 2238 (citing NLRB v. Pre-Engineered Bldg, Prods., Inc., 603 F.2d 134, 136 (10th Cir. 1979)).
In applying this rule, the Board considers
(1) whether the job classifications designated for the operation are substantially filled, (2) whether the new
business is at a substantially normal level of operations, (3) the difference between the current size of the
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of Fall River's employees4° were former employees of Sterlingwale. 41 The second
was whether there was "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise. "42 The Board explained in Aircraft Magnesium43 that "[t]he traditional
criteria for this [second] test include whether there has been substantial continuity in
the following: (1) business operations; (2) plant; (3) work force; (4) jobs and working
conditions; (5) supervisors; (6) machinery, equipment, and methods of production;
and (7) product or service."44
Both the majority45 and the dissent46 in Fall River cited with approval these
seven indicia of successorship. However, they differed in the application of these
factors to the facts in the case. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's determination
that the requisite continuity was present. 47
This Comment focuses on this determination and argues that Fall River was
incorrectly decided because there was insufficient continuity between the old and the
new employers. 48 This Comment 49 also argues that, even if there were enough
complement and its size at the time the business reaches a normal level of operations, (4) the time expected to
elapse before a substantially larger complement will be at work, and (5) the relative certainty of the employer's
anticipated expansion of the complement.
NLRB v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 825 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing FallRiver, 107 S. Ct. at 2239 (citing Premium
Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1983))). Fall River argued that this rule is invalid because it is
inconsistent with Burns, at least where the "full complement" rule would not be difficult to apply. Brief for Petitioner
at 27-31, Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987) (No. 85-1208) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner]. Even if one accepts the rule as valid, however, "the date chosen by the NLRB for measuring the substantial
complement standard is unsupportable, and the Court's affirmance of this choice, curious." FallRiver, 107 S. Ct. at 2245
(Powell, J., dissenting). Admittedly, the rule is designed to be "applied impressionistically rather than mechanically."
Fasman & Fischler, supra note 20, at 32. However, of the five factors which the Board considers, the first is the only
one supporting the January 1983 date. A "complete range of jobs" had been filled by as early as November 1982. Fall
River, 107 S. Ct. at 2231. On the other hand, the business was not near its normal operating level in January 1983. Only
one shift was in operation at that time, and the employer had definite plans to implement a second shift within only three
months. Fall River, 272 N.L.R.B. at 840. There was never any serious doubt that this expansion would take place, and,
in fact, the second shift was in place by April 1983. Id. Thus, four of the Board's five criteria indicate that January 1983
was an inappropriate time for measuring the carryover of employees from Sterlingwale to Fall River.
The Board should re-examine the means by which it determines the appropriate date for assessing employee
caryover. Although the substantial and representative complement rule is not inappropriate, the Board should adhere
more strictly to the five criteria which it has established.
40. An additional requirement was that a majority of Fall River's employees supported the Union. For a discussion
of this issue and the presumptions which the Board applies in determining the Union's majority status, see infra text
accompanying notes 116-45.
41. But see Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2237 n. 12 (suggesting that, although the great weight of authority supports
this proposition, a slightly different interpretation of Burns and Howard Johnson is possible).
42. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551.
43. 265 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 1345.
45. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2236.
46. Id. at 2243 (Powell, J., dissenting),
47. Id. at 2236.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 51-115.
49. An additional issue raised by the case is beyond the scope of this Comment. The employer maintained that the
Board's "continuing demand" rule, whereby a union's premature demand for recognition continues in force until the time
when it can properly be made, should not apply in successorship situations. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 31-35.
The Court rejected this argument, noting that "[ilt makes no sense to require the union repeatedly to renew its bargaining
demand in the hope of having it correspond with the 'substantial and representative complement' date, when, with little
trouble, the employer can regard a previous demand as a continuing one." Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2241. See also
1985-1986 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 28 B.C.L. REv. 25, 53-57 (1986)
(applauding the First Circuit's approval of the continuing demand rule in Fall River).
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continuity to establish a bargaining duty, the Board improperly disregarded evidence
that the Union lacked the support of a majority of Fall River's employees.50
II. ANALYSIS
A. Continuity of the Enterprise
The Court's conclusion that Fall River was a successor to Sterlingwale for
purposes of the duty to bargain can best be evaluated by considering separately, to the
extent possible, each of the seven criteria listed in Aircraft Magnesium.5 1 The criteria
that the Board purports to consider in successorship cases have been relatively
consistent over the years52 and were not questioned by Fall River. Thus, they provide
a useful framework for discussion.
The first of these seven factors, the continuity of business operations, was one
of the main areas of disagreement. The Board gave very little weight to the
seven-month hiatus between the cessation of Sterlingwale's operations and the start
of Fall River's operations, referring to it only in a footnote.5 3 Both the court of
appeals 54 and the Supreme Court55 recognized that the hiatus is a factor that should
be considered, but indicated that, by itself, it does not preclude successorship. The
Supreme Court discounted the hiatus because of its "less than certain" nature, 56
pointing out that Sterlingwale retained a skeleton crew during most of the period and
that its owner was attempting to revive the enterprise.57 Justice Powell, in his
dissenting opinion, recognized the importance of the hiatus, describing it as a "clear
break." '58 The employees had reason to question the viability of the predecessor
enterprise when they were laid off indefinitely. 59 As time went by, the likelihood that
they would be rehired at the same location quickly decreased. 60 Thus, one of the key
sets of factual circumstances justifying the successor employer doctrine-that the
retained employees "view their job situations as essentially unaltered" 6 -does not
exist in this case.
Of course, Fall River does not indicate that a hiatus of seven months or less is
50. See infra text accompanying notes 116-45.
51. See supra text accompanying note 44.
52. See Comment, Successorship Doctrine: A Hybrid Approach Threatens to Extend the Doctrine When the Union
Strikes Out, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 263, 274-76 (1984). While one commentator has asserted that "the factors considered
in the analysis of successorship have continuously changed," Note, Expansion of the Successorship Doctrine-Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 23 WAK FoRasr L. REv. 549, 569 (1988), a more accurate statement would be that
the Board's application of the criteria has sometimes produced conflicting results. See Slicker, A Reconsideration of the
Doctrine of Employer Successorship-A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MN. L. Rv. 1051, 1054-63 (1973).
53. Fall River, 272 N.L.R.B. at 840 n.4.
54. Fall River, 775 F.2d at 429.
55. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2237.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2243 (Powell, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2244 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 21.
60. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2244 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973). See also NLRB v. Aquabrom, 855 F.2d 1174,
1179 (6th Cir.), amended, 862 F.2d 100 (1988) ("By focusing on the employees' perspective in conducting the substantial
continuity inquiry, the Board furthers the Act's policy of industrial peace.").
[Vol. 50:181
NLRB EXPANSIVE SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE
always insignificant. The Board, however, may be leaning toward such a conclusion.
In Briggs Plumbingware, Inc.,62 the Board discounted the importance of a three-
month hiatus because it was shorter than that in Fall River.63 The courts in Fall River
simply upheld the Board's decision not to give much weight to the seven-month
hiatus under the circumstances of that case, and the Board should not interpret Fall
River more broadly.
The employer also argued that there was no continuity of business operations
because there was no transfer of customer lists between Sterlingwale and Fall River. 64
Nevertheless, over half of Fall River's dollar volume was attributable to former
customers of Sterlingwale. 65 Fall River argued that sales to one of its customers,
Marcamy Sales Corp., should be excluded from this calculation, in which case only
one-third of its sales would be attributable to former Sterlingwale customers. 66 This
argument was based on the fact that one of Fall River's largest shareholders was the
president of Marcamy. 67 The majority and dissenting opinions took note of these
arguments and apparently gave them at least some weight in the context of the totality
of circumstances test for successorship. 6s
The Board's current view on this subject is unclear. In Good N' Fresh Foods,
Inc.,69 the new employer did business with only a few of the old employer's
customers. 70 The Board, though, held that
the successorship doctrine does not require that the predecessor and the successor have the
same customers. Rather[,] as indicated by the Supreme Court, the pertinent question is
whether they "basically [have] the same body of customers," i.e.[,] whether they do
business in the same market. Here, [the old employer] did and the [new employer] does
business with the same class of customers, i.e., both sell to wholesale and retail distributors
of bakery products. 7'
However, in Faria, Ltd.,72 decided only two days after Good N' Fresh, the Board felt
obliged to compare the particular customers of the old and new employers before
finding that successorship existed. 73 Given the contradictory reasoning in these two
cases, the meaning of the phrase "same body of customers" is likely to be the subject
of future litigation.
The second factor the Board considers in determining whether a successorship
situation exists is whether the new employer uses the same physical plant.74 This
issue is closely related to the question of whether the same machinery, equipment,
62. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (Nov. 27, 1987) (LEXIS, Labor library, NLRB file).
63. Id. (citing the First Circuit's decision in Fall River).
64. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2243 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 18.
65. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2231.
66. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 18.
67. See Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2230.
68. Id. at 2236-37; id. at 2243 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69. 287 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 1988 NLRB LEXIS 59.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 25 (quoting Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2236) (second set of brackets in original).
72. 287 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 1988 NLRB LEXIS 35.
73. Id. at 14-15.
74. Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984).
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and methods of production are used, 75 so it is useful to discuss them together. At first
glance, the facts in this case would seem to favor the Board's position on this point
because a substantial amount of Fall River's plant and equipment was acquired from
Sterlingwale.76 However, Fall River argued that, because some of these assets were
acquired at public auction, the sales were not evidence of continuity of the
enterprise.77 The Court rejected this argument, in part because Fall River was formed
for the purpose of acquiring Sterlingwale's assets. 78 Viewed in the context of all of
the facts of the case, the Court's explanation is unsatisfactory. This was not a
situation in which the new employer purchased most of the old employer's business
assets. 79 As Fall River's brief pointed out, the new employer did not acquire
Sterlingwale's trade name, good will, personnel records, or other intangible assets,
nor did it assume any of Sterlingwale's liabilities.80 "[Tihe fact that the physical
plant and equipment once were a part of Sterlingwale's operation should be totally
irrelevant to the successorship determination." 8 1
Fall River did not seriously argue that there was a change in the methods of
production.8 2 As the Court noted, "from the perspective of the employees, their jobs
did not change. Although petitioner abandoned converting dyeing in exclusive favor
of commission dyeing, this change did not alter the essential nature of the employees'
jobs, because both types of dyeing involved the same production process." 83 This
focus on the employees' perspective is appropriate because the purpose of the
successor employer doctrine is to preclude a new employer from avoiding the duty to
bargain in a situation where, from the employees' point of view, nothing has
changed. Thus, standing alone, the fact that there was no change in production
methods tends to support the Board's finding of successorship.
The third factor, continuity of the work force,8 4 is always one of the most
important issues85 because the successorship doctrine necessarily focuses on the
relationship between a defined group of employees and their new employer.8 6 The
dispute in this case focused on the means by which the employees of Sterlingwale
75. See id.
76. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2230.
77. Id. at 2236 n. 10.
78. Id.
79. Cf. NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962).
80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 16.
81. Id. at 17.
82. But see infra text accompanying notes 104-07.
83. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2236.
84. See Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984).
85. It has been suggested not only that continuity of the work force is more important than the other factors, but
also that this issue should be considered as a threshold matter before determining whether any of the other indicia of
successorship are present. Comment, The Successorship Doctrine: In Search of a New Focus, 17 Vn-at. m' L. REv.
405, 441 (1981). This approach would be appropriate if continuity of the work force were a purely numerical matter.
However, as this Comment's discussion of the Fall River case demonstrates, this is not always so. See infra text
accompanying notes 87-96.
86. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 263-64 (1974). Actually, there
were two distinct issues regarding continuity of the work force in FallRiver. One issue involved the point in time at which
this continuity should be assessed. See supra note 39. The other issue was the continuity itself. See infra notes 87-96 and
accompanying text.
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became employees of Fall River. These employees had been laid off by Sterlingwale
when it went out of business.8 7 Fall River argued that
[t]here was no transfer of employee personnel records between Sterlingwale and Fall River,
no direct transfer of any employees or personnel, and there was no expectation by
Sterlingwale's employees of employment by Fall River. It is submitted that the employment
of individuals who formerly worked for Sterlingwale resulted from factors unique to a small
town with a shrinking industrial base. Many of the employees who had been permanently
laid off by Sterlingwale in February, 1982, eagerly applied for positions at a new mill
opening in their city. Production and maintenance employees were all hired on the open
market from newspaper advertisements.88
Although the Court mentioned this argument, 89 it apparently found that because a
majority of Fall River's employees had previously been employees of Sterlingwale,
and because Fall River's hiring decisions took into account the applicants' previous
employment with Sterlingwale and the recommendations of former Sterlingwale
supervisors, 90 continuity of the work force existed. 91
The Board should have considered Fall River's hiring practices to be strong
evidence that it was not a successor to Sterlingwale for purposes of the duty to
bargain. 92 An employer is free, within limits, 93 to restructure its labor force or other
aspects of its business. 94 This is an essential ingredient of an employer's right to
operate its business efficiently. It is not disputed that Fall River, by advertising its job
openings in the newspaper and not seeking to acquire a list of Sterlingwale's former
employees, sought to avoid a duty to bargain with the Union. However, there is no
logical reason why an employer should be prohibited from taking action to avoid a
legal duty, 95 as long as that action is not designed to disguise that duty. 96 Thus, the
Court's deference to the Board on this issue was inappropriate.
Fall River's principal argument regarding the fourth factor, similarity of jobs and
working conditions, 97 was that it had substantially fewer employees than Sterlingwale
and that it employed two ten-hour shifts, compared with Sterlingwale's three
eight-hour shifts. Fall River maintained that these differences constituted substantial
87. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2229.
88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 16-17.
89. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2237.
90. See id. at 2230.
91. See id. at 2236.
92. The Board's Decision and Order did not address this matter. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 272
N.L.R.B. 839 (1984), enforced, 775 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
93. For example, an employer commits an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982), if its hiring methods discriminate on the basis of union membership. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406
U.S. 272, 280 n.5 (1972).
94. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
95. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 269 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("'The effect [of the Court's decision] is to allow any new employer to determine for himself whether he will
be bound [by the old employer's duties], by the simple expedient of arranging for the termination of all of the prior
employer's personnel.").
96. Cf. Kallman v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981) (new employer violated § 8(a)(3) of the Act when it
disguised its identity in newspaper advertisements in order to make it less likely that union members would apply forjobs).
97. See Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345 (1982), enforced, 730 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984).
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changes in the working conditions. 98 Neither the majority nor the minority in the
Supreme Court directly responded to this argument, although Judge Torruella
mentioned it in his dissent from the First Circuit's decision. 99
The fifth factor the Board ordinarily considers is whether the old and new
enterprises employ the same supervisors. 100 The Court noted that "most of [Fall
River's supervisors] were former supervisors of Sterlingwale." 10 1 Fall River, while
not disputing this fact, nevertheless asserted that there had been "a major changeover
in the supervisory hierarchy. The number of supervisors has been substantially
reduced from 18 to 12, including the employment of 4 new supervisors who had not
been previously employed by Sterlingwale. The former plant manager has been
terminated and not rehired by Fall River."' 102 In other words, eight of Fall River's
twelve supervisors had been employed by Sterlingwale. Since the Court's function is
only to assess whether the Board acts rationally and reasonably,103 the Court correctly
decided not to view this change in supervisors as evidence of discontinuity between
the old and new employers.
The final factor-whether there is a change in the products or services
offered' 04 -is, in this case, related to the question of whether the old and new
employers used the same methods of production.OS Although the change from pri-
marily converting dyeing to exclusively commission dyeing did not involve a change
in production methods, there is a strong argument that it constituted a fundamental
change in the services provided. The Board concluded that "[t]he enterprise is not
identical, but it is similar." 106 In reaching this conclusion, the Board failed to consider
the change in services in light of the other facts of the case. This difference in services
resulted in "substantial changes in Fall River's operation when compared to Ster-
lingwale: a smaller manufacturing plant, [fewer] employees, [fewer] work shifts,
[and] longer working hours."' 07 The change in services also resulted in a change in
financing and marketing methods. 108 As Justice Powell commented," [t]his difference
[in services] alone would not be determinative, but it hardly is irrelevant."' 0 9
It should be noted that the precise issue before the Court was whether the
Board's finding of "substantial continuity in the employing enterprise"110 was based
on a rule which was "rational and consistent with the Act,""' and "supported by
substantial evidence on the record." 112 Six members of the Court were persuaded that
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 17-18.
99. See Fall River, 775 F.2d at 439 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
100. See Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1345.
101. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2236.
102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 20.
103. See Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2235.
104. See Aircraft Magnesium, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1345.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
106. Fall River, 272 N.L.R.B. at 840.
107. Fall River, 775 F.2d at 439 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
108. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2242 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Fall River, 272 N.L.R.B. at 840.
111. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2235.
112. Id.
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the Board's conclusion met this standard; three members were not. Justice Powell
concluded that "the undisputed evidence shows that petitioner is a completely
separate entity from Sterlingwale." 1 1 3 Judge Torruella's dissent expressed this view
in even stronger language: "There is no question in my mind but that there has been
no continuity between the operations of Sterlingwale and Fall River." 114 It is difficult
to determine on which factors the Court or the dissenters relied most heavily in
assessing the rationality of the Board's decision. Therefore, as in any set of cases in
which the result depends on the "totality of the circumstances," it is difficult to use
this case to predict the result of future cases.11 5 It remains clear, however, that the
Court is willing to go to great lengths to find rationality in the Board's decisions.
B. The Union's Majority Status
The next issue before the Court was whether Fall River could lawfully refuse to
bargain with Local 292, notwithstanding a finding of "substantial continuity in the
employing enterprise." 6 Under subsection 8(a)(5) of the Act, an employer is only
required to bargain with the "representatives of his employees,"' 1 7 subject to the
exclusivity principle of subsection 9(a). " 8 If a union is not the representative of the
employees, the employer not only has no duty to bargain with it, but also is not
permitted to do so.
In administering subsection 8(a)(5), the Board, with the support of the courts,
has for many years applied an irrebuttable presumption that, for one year following
the certification of a union as the bargaining representative of a group of employees,
the union enjoys the support of a majority of the employees." 9 In the absence of
"unusual circumstances," the employer may not escape its subsection 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain by introducing evidence that the union does not in fact represent the
employees. 20 This is a sensible rule. It increases stability and continuity in
bargaining relationships, thereby promoting industrial peace, which is the primary
purpose of the Act.' 2' Continual litigation over a union's majority status would
frustrate this legislative goal. In addition, the irrebuttable presumption is not
inconsistent with democratic principles. Like voters in an election of a government
official, employees may not change the results of a union certification election simply
113. Id. at 2243 (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. Fall River, 775 F.2d at 439 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
115. See Comment, Successorship and the Obligation to Bargain: Clarifying the Steps Toward a Highly Subjective
Analysis, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 685, 705 & n.214 (1988); see also Comment, Criteria for Determining Employer
Successorship-FactorAnalysis, Bums, and the Need for a New Standard, 11 VAr FoRsT L. REv. 437,456-57 (1975)
(making a similar observation about the Burns decision).
116. See Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2232-35.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). For the text of § 9(a), see supra note 14.
119. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
120. Id. at 98.
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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because they change their minds the next day. 122 The Court in Burns approved of the
application of the irrebuttable presumption to a successor employer. 123
A union also enjoys a rebuttable presumption of majority support for a
reasonable time even after one year has passed since certification. 124 In Fall River,
the Court considered whether the rebuttable presumption should be extended to
successor employer situations. 125 This was an important issue in the case because
there was substantial evidence, which the Board refused to consider, that a majority
of the employees were in fact dissatisfied with Local 292.126
The Court concluded that the rebuttable presumption is applicable to successor
employers. 127 The Court reasoned that, after a transition in employers, employees
might be inclined to shun support for their former union, especially if they believe that such
support will jeopardize their jobs with the successor or if they are inclined to blame the union
for their layoff and problems associated with it. Without the presumptions of majority
support and with the wide variety of corporate transformations possible, an employer could
use a successor enterprise as a way of getting rid of a labor contract and of exploiting the
employees' hesitant attitude towards the union to eliminate its continuing presence. 28
This reasoning would be appropriate if offered in support of the presumptions of
majority support which the Board has historically applied. It would also be
appropriate as a justification for the holding in Burns that the irrebuttable presump-
tion applies to a successor employer if the transition in employers occurs during the
certification year. As the Court correctly pointed out more than thirty years ago, "[a]
union should be given ample time for carrying out its mandate on behalf of its
members, and should not be under exigent pressure to produce hothouse results or be
turned out.' 1 29
The extension of this reasoning to the situation presented in Fall River, however,
is unwarranted. In Fall River, unlike successorship cases in which the union was
recently certified, 30 "[t]he certification status of the union[] is lost in ancient
history." 1 31 Under such circumstances, there is little need to give the union "ample
time for carrying out its mandate." Furthermore, there are countervailing consider-
ations. The Court's reasoning in Fall River implicitly assumes that the employees are
not capable of making rational decisions. In fact, one of the primary underlying
premises of the NLRA is that the government's role is only to facilitate collective
bargaining, not to control it. 132 Congress assumed that employees have the intelli-
gence and information necessary to select a bargaining representative; the certifica-
122. See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 99.
123. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1972).
124. Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951).
125. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2233-35.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 135-45.
127. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2235.
128. Id. at 2234.
129. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100 (1954).
130. E.g., Burns, 406 U.S. at 274 (certification election held less than four months before the transition in
employers).
131. Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1145 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell, J., dissenting).
132. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970).
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tion provisions of the Act merely provide a mechanism for them to make this choice.
The Court's decision frustrates this democratic objective by imposing an artificial
barrier to a finding that Fall River's employees were dissatisfied with their union after
the change in employers.
In the limited situation presented by Fall River, where a transition in employers
occurs long after the certification year, a presumption that the incumbent union
enjoys the support of a majority of the employees is inappropriate. The Act's
democratic goals will more likely be advanced if
a union seeking to represent a successor's workforce [is] required to follow the normal
methods of establishing its representation rights by petitioning for and winning an NLRB
election. If a majority of the successor's employees do, in fact, support the predecessor's
union, it will be an easy matter for that union to promptly obtain authorization cards from
that majority, seek recognition from the successor and, failing voluntary recognition,
petition the NLRB for an employee election. Not only is this the preferred method of
establishing representation rights, it will usually be quicker and more effective than asserting
and litigating unfair labor practice charges based on "presumptions" of majority support. 33
After finding that the rebuttable presumption applied, the Court concluded that
Fall River was obligated to bargain with the Union. 134 In so holding, the Court
ignored evidence which demonstrated the employees' lack of support for the Union.
The Court did not explain why this evidence did not overcome the presumption.
When Sterlingwale laid off its employees, it failed to provide the health and
welfare benefits and severance pay that were required by the collective bargaining
agreement. 135 Evidence showed that the employees were dissatisfied with the Union's
failure to secure these benefits. 136 This dissatisfaction is understandable; employees
who wished to maintain their life and health insurance coverage were forced to pay
the premiums themselves. 137 More importantly, eighty percent of Fall River's
employees signed petitions stating that they did not desire representation by Local
292.138 This evidence is especially significant in light of the seven-month break in
operations, 139 because employees might be expected to blame their union for such a
hiatus in their employment.140 The NLRB refused to consider these petitions, because
they were signed after the date when the employer's bargaining obligation arose. 141
However, since there was independent evidence that the employees were dissatisfied
133. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of the Petitioner
at 19, Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987) (No. 85-1208). Although Justice Powell
did not go this far in his dissenting opinion, he did suggest that "it certainly would be reasonable to assume that the more
remote the certification, the weaker the presumption should be that the union retains majority support." Fall River, 107
S. Ct. at 2242 n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting). But see NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that
the rebuttable presumption applies because, among other things, given a more complex rule, it would be too difficult to
differentiate between situations in which it applies and situations in which it does not apply).
134. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2235.
135. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 3-4; see also Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2234 n.7.
136. Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2234 n.7.
137. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 4, 10.
138. Id. at 8, 10-11.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
140. See Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HI-lv. L. REv. 759, 767 (1975).
141. See Fall River, 107 S. Ct. at 2240 n.18.
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with the Union many months before that date, 142 the petitions can hardly be
considered irrelevant. On the contrary, they substantiate the independent evidence of
employee dissatisfaction with the Union.1 43
Because the Board excluded relevant evidence which strongly suggests the
employees' dissatisfaction with the Union, the Court at least should have remanded
the case to the Board with directions to consider this evidence. The function of the
rebuttable presumption is to place on the employer the burden of proof to show either
that the incumbent union does not represent a majority of the employees or that the
employer has a good faith doubt of the union's majority. 144 Both the Board and the
Court essentially treated the presumption as irrebuttable and thus did not even follow
the rule they purported to establish. 145 As a result, they reached a conclusion that was
unfair to both the employer and the employees.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the Supreme Court's approval, the NLRB has unnecessarily broadened the
successor employer doctrine, producing the unjust result in this case. Fall River was
found to be obligated to bargain with Local 292, even though Fall River's connection
with Sterlingwale was tenuous and the employees did not support the Union. The
Board's willingness to find successorship in cases such as this benefits neither
employees nor employers. Potential employers may prefer not to invest in and
revitalize an enterprise to avoid risking a determination of successorship.146 Thus,
investment is directed away from traditionally unionized industries. On the other
hand, the decision in Fall River may encourage unions to demand recognition by new
employers, even when this is not in the best interests of the employees.
The Board has developed seven sound criteria for assessing the continuity
between the old and the new employer. It is possible that one of these criteria-
continuity of the business operations-backfired on Fall River. The Board gave very
little weight to the seven-month hiatus between Sterlingwale's demise and the
beginning of Fall River's operations. One explanation is that such a hiatus can be
easily manufactured by a new employer who wishes to avoid a duty to bargain with
the union which represents his predecessor's employees; all he must do is shut down
for several months. The Board may have wanted to discourage employers from
implementing this tactic. If this is the correct explanation for the decision, then the
142. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
143. See Royal Coach Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 838 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying a similar principle in a
voluntary recognition case).
144. Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480-81 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 929 (1970).
145. This is typical of the Board's treatment of the rebuttable presumption of majority status. Once the presumption
is established, the Board very rarely finds that it has been rebutted. See, e.g., B & B Gallo Pest Control Servs., Inc., 265
N.L.R.B. 535, 539 (1982); Plymouth Locomotive Works, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 595, 605-06 (1982). But see City Supply
Corp., 217 N.L.R.B. 950, 953 (1975) (effectively holding that the presumption was rebutted when employer had only
three employees, two of whom quit their jobs and were replaced, and the other of whom died). If the Board's position
is that a practically irrebuttable presumption of majority status should apply even after the certification year, it should so
state, although the case for such a presumption is obviously weaker than the case for a truly rebuttable presumption.
146. See Note, supra note 52, at 574.
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Board overcompensated, because there is substantial evidence other than the hiatus
indicating a lack of continuity between the employers.
The Board's successorship criteria and its presumption of majority support are
designed to promote industrial peace, but, as Fall River illustrates, they often do so
at the expense of industrial democracy. The Board should adopt a more balanced
approach to these problems. Of course, the successorship doctrine is essential to
preserve employees' expectations and to ease transitions in business ownership.
However, the doctrine should be more narrowly applied in future cases.
Marc A. Tenenbaum

